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In this paper I construct a search model of a large labor market in which workers are
heterogeneous in productivity and (homogeneous) ﬁrms post wages and a ranking of workers
to direct workers’ search. I establish the following results. First, the wage diﬀerential is
negatively related to productivity when the productivity diﬀerential is small, while a positive
relationship emerges when the productivity diﬀerential is large. Second, as the productivity
diﬀerential decreases to zero, the reverse wage diﬀerential increases and so it remains strictly
positive in the limit. Third, high-productivity workers are not discriminated against even
when they have a lower wage, because they always have a higher priority in employment
and higher expected wage than low-productivity workers. Fourth, the equilibrium is socially
eﬃcient, and so the wage diﬀerential and the ranking are part of the eﬃcient mechanism.
Finally, I provide numerical examples to illustrate the wage distribution.
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Standard economic theories view wage diﬀerentials as a compensation for workers’ human capital
or productivity. These theories have encountered great diﬃculties in explaining the large wage
diﬀerentials in the US data. For example, Juhn et al. (1993) have found that all observable
characteristics of workers’ productivity, such as education, experience and age, can explain only
one-third of the diﬀerential between the ninetieth and the tenth percentile of the wage distribution
between 1963 and 1989. On the other hand, wage diﬀerentials seem to depend statistically on
seemingly irrelevant background characteristics, such as workers’ race, gender, and height. To
allow for this anomalous dependence, the standard theory attributes it to discrimination.1
Given these diﬃculties, it is useful to explore alternative theories of the labor market. In a
seminal paper, Mortensen (1982) provided one such alternative that emphasizes search frictions
in the labor market. He characterized an eﬃcient compensation scheme in a class of frictional
markets and showed that prices (or wages) may depart signiﬁcantly from Walrasian prices in
order to achieve eﬃciency. Now, there is a large and still growing literature that explores the
importance of search frictions in the labor market (see Mortensen, 2002, for the references).
The current paper follows this line of research. The main purpose is to illustrate that wage
diﬀerentials are sometimes a bad indicator of productivity diﬀerentials and discrimination. I will
establish the following results. First, a wage diﬀerential can be negatively related to the produc-
tivity diﬀerential and the size of this reverse wage diﬀerential increases when workers become
more and more similar in productivity. Thus, even when the productivity diﬀerential approaches
zero, a wage diﬀerential still exists in equilibrium. Second, in contrast to the standard interpre-
tation, the reverse wage diﬀerential is not discrimination. On the contrary, higher productivity
is always rewarded with a higher expected wage, which takes workers’ employment probability
1See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a survey of the facts and the literature on discrimination in the labor market.
A popular spinoﬀ is the theory of statistical discrimination. It argues that when ﬁrms are uncertain about workers’
fundamental characteristics, discrimination can be an equilibrium outcome, either because the characteristics on
which discrimination is based are correlated with workers’ fundamental characteristics, or because discrimination
leads to self-fulﬁlling separation of worker types.
1into account. Third, the equilibrium is socially eﬃcient, and so the diﬀerentials in wages and
employment probabilities are part of the eﬃcient mechanism.
The model is one with directed search. It can be best described for the case where there
are only two types of workers. A worker’s type is determined by one observable skill, which I
call productivity. The diﬀerence in productivity among workers can be very small. All ﬁrms are
identical. They simultaneously post wages and ranking schemes for the workers. Each ﬁrm can
post diﬀerent wages for diﬀerent types of workers, but is restricted to give identical workers the
same ranking and the same wage. After observing ﬁrms’ announcements, workers decide which
ﬁrm to apply and they cannot coordinate their applications. After receiving the applicants, each
ﬁrm selects one worker according to the ranking scheme and pays the posted wage. Search is
directed because, when choosing the wage and the ranking scheme, each ﬁrm takes into account
the eﬀect of its announcements on the matching probability.
I show that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where identical workers use the same
application strategies. Every ﬁrm attracts both types of workers with positive probability, and so
separation of the two types is not an equilibrium. Moreover, every ﬁrm gives high-productivity
workers the priority in employment whenever the ﬁrm receives both types of workers. However,
when the productivity diﬀerential is small, this employment advantage comes with a lower wage.
The reverse wage diﬀerential arises from the trade-oﬀ between the employment probability
and wage. Workers care about the expected wage, which is the employment probability times the
wage. By giving high-productivity workers a higher ranking, a ﬁrm can lower the actual wage
by a discrete amount for these workers and yet still be able to attract them. The combination
of a high ranking and low wage is optimal for a ﬁrm, because it enables the ﬁrm to increase the
utilization of high-productivity workers. The combination is also attractive to high-productivity
workers, provided that the combination yields higher expected wage. Indeed, the expected wage
is always higher for high-productivity workers than for low-productivity workers.
Despite the non-standard features of actual wages, I show that the equilibrium is socially
2eﬃcient in the following sense: If a social planner tries to maximize expected aggregate output
under the constraint of the same matching function as the one generated in the equilibrium, then
the planner will choose the same allocation between workers and ﬁrms as in the equilibrium.
The eﬃciency result is in accordance with Mortensen’s (1982) general result on eﬃciency, in the
sense that each worker’s expected wage in the current model takes into account the expected
crowding-out that the particular worker creates on other workers (see also Hosios, 1990). Notice
that eﬃciency entails both the ranking of workers and the wage diﬀerential.
I extend the model to a market where there are many types of workers, characterize the
equilibrium and use numerical examples to illustrate the equilibrium wage distribution.
This paper belongs to the search literature (see Mortensen, 2002). Most of the papers in this
literature assume that search is not directed. For models of directed search, see Peters (1991),
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Burdett et al. (2001), Julien et al. (2000), and Shi (2001, 2002).2
These models have either homogeneous agents on both sides of the market, or heterogeneous
agents on both sides of the market who are complementary with each other in production. The
model in the current paper lies somewhere in between — it has heterogeneous workers and identical
ﬁrms. Shimer (1997) constructs a model similar to mine with two types of workers. Although
our results overlap to some extent, his focus is to contrast the eﬀects of diﬀerent mechanics of
wage determination on the division of the match surplus. In particular, he does not emphasize
the reverse wage diﬀerential that can arise in the directed search environment.
Search models are used to examine discrimination by Black (1995) and Bowlus and Eckstein
(2002). They show that if some ﬁrms have prejudice against a subset of workers, then the search
cost will support a wage diﬀerential in the steady state. In contrast to my model, search in these
models is not directed. More importantly, my model does not rely on the exogenous prejudice
to generate a large wage diﬀerential among similar workers. On the issue of discrimination, the
model most closely related to mine is Lang et al. (2002). An important diﬀerence is that they
restrict each ﬁrm to post only one wage for all workers whom the ﬁrm tries to attract; i.e., the
2The model of competitive search by Moen (1997) also falls into this category.
3ﬁrm is not allowed to post diﬀerent wages for diﬀerent workers. As a result, the two types of
workers are completely separated in their model. Such separation is not an equilibrium and is
not eﬃcient when each ﬁrm can post a diﬀerent wage for each type of workers.
I will organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, I will describe the simple model with two
types of workers and propose a candidate equilibrium. Section 3 will show that the candidate
equilibrium is indeed the unique equilibrium. In Section 4, I will examine the properties of the
equilibrium and show that the equilibrium is socially eﬃcient. Section 5 will extend the model
to incorporate many types of workers. I will then conclude in Section 6 and supply the necessary
proofs in the Appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. Workers and Firms
Consider a labor market with a large number of workers, N. There are two types of workers, type
T and type S.T y p eT workers are a fraction γ of all workers and type S af r a c t i o n( 1−γ), where
γ ∈ (0,1). Sometimes, I use the notation γT = γ and γS =1− γ. A worker’s type is observed
immediately upon applying to a job. A type S worker produces y units of output and a type T
worker produces (1+δ)y,w h e r eδ > 0. In a large part of the analysis in this paper, I will restrict
δ to be suﬃciently small. The purpose is to examine whether a small productivity diﬀerence can
generate a large wage diﬀerential.
There are also a large number of ﬁrms, M, all of which are identical. For the moment, this
number is ﬁxed. Competitive entry of ﬁrms can be introduced easily and will be brieﬂy discussed
at the end of section 5.1. Each ﬁrm wants to hire only one worker. Denote the tightness of the
market as θ = N/M.
The recruiting game is as follows. First, all ﬁrms make their announcements simultaneously.
Each ﬁrm i announces two wages, wiT for type T workers and wiS for types S workers, together
with a rule that ranks the two types of applicants. Let Ri ∈ {1,0,Φ} denote this ranking or
priority rule, where Φ =[ 0 ,1]. The ﬁrm selects type T workers ﬁr s ti fi ts e t sRi =1a n dt y p e
4S workers ﬁrst if it sets Ri =0 ;I fRi = Φ,t h eﬁrm is indiﬀerent between the two types of
workers.3 Once a ﬁrm posts the wages and the selection rule, it is committed to them. All
workers observe all announcements and then decide which ﬁrm to apply to. This application
decision can possibly be mixed strategies over the jobs. Let αij denote the probability with which
at y p ej worker applies to ﬁrm i. After receiving the applicants, a ﬁrm selects a worker according
to the announced ranking and pays the corresponding wage. The worker produces immediately,
obtains the wage and the game ends.
Notice that a worker’s strategy does not depend on the worker’s identity. Thus, all workers
of the same type must use the same strategy. This symmetry requirement on the workers’ side
reﬂects the realistic feature of the labor market that workers cannot coordinate their application
decisions.4 However, the coordination failure could be eliminated if ﬁrms could identify each
worker and make an oﬀer speciﬁcally to that worker. To preserve the coordination failure, I
assume that each ﬁrm’s oﬀer and, in particular, the ranking rule should not depend on the
identities of the workers whom the ﬁrm receives. This does not mean that all ﬁrms must use the
same strategy. To the contrary, a ﬁrm’s strategy is allowed to depend on the ﬁrm’s identity. This
allowance is necessary for examining the possibility of a separating equilibrium where two groups
of ﬁrms each attract a distinct type of workers.
I will focus on the limit of the economy where N and M approach inﬁnity while their ratio,
θ, lies in the interior of (0,∞). The equilibrium in this limit is signiﬁcantly easier to characterize
than the ﬁnite economy, because a single ﬁrm’s deviation does not aﬀect workers’ payoﬀ from
applying to other ﬁrms. More precisely, let pij be the probability with which a type j worker
3The ranking scheme is included in a ﬁrm’s announcement to ease the description. However, ﬁrms do not have
to post the ranking literally. For the model to work, all that is needed is that workers expect the ﬁrms to use the
ranking scheme to select workers after workers apply. This expectation will be fulﬁlled since the ranking scheme
in the equilibrium is compatible with the ﬁrms’ ex post incentive.
4The set of asymmetric equilibria is large. In a model with two identical agents on each side of the market,
Burdett et al. (2001) have shown that there are a continuum of asymmetric equilibria while there is a unique
symmetric equilibrium.
5who applies to a ﬁrm i gets the job. Deﬁne the “market wage” of a type j worker as follows:






In the limit described above, the eﬀect of ﬁrm i’s strategy on pi0j approaches zero (see Burdett
et al., 2001). Thus, each ﬁrm takes Ej as given.
A worker maximizes the expected wage that he can obtain from applying to a job. Given
Ej,at y p ej worker’s strategy is to choose αij =1i fpijwij >E j, αij =0i fpijwij <E j,a n d
αij ∈ (0,1) if pijwij = Ej. In the limit economy, it is convenient to express this strategy with a





= ∞, if pijwij >E j
=0 , if pijwij <E j
∈ (0,∞), if pijwij = Ej.
(2.2)





qij = γjθ, j = T,S. (2.3)
When all type j workers use the strategy qij, the expected number of type j applicants received
by ﬁrm i is γjNαij = qij. For this reason, I call qij the queue length of type j workers for ﬁrm
i. Despite the coincidence between a worker’s strategy and the queue length, one should not
construed an individual choice of q as the worker’s ability to inﬂuence other workers’ or ﬁrms’
decisions. When qij > 0, I say that the ﬁrm i attracts type j workers.
In the limit where the economy becomes inﬁnitely large, the probability with which ﬁrm i
attracts one or more type j worker is 1 −(1 − γjαij)
N → 1−e−qij.I fﬁrm i gives type j workers
the selection priority, then the employment probability of a type j worker at the ﬁrm is:







On the other hand, if ﬁrm i give the other type j0 6= j the priority, then the ﬁrm will consider a
type j worker only if the ﬁrm receives no type j0 applicants. This event occurs with probability
6e−qij0, in which case each type j worker applying to the ﬁrm is chosen with probability G(qij).
Thus, for a general priority rule Ri, a worker’s employment probability at ﬁrm i is:
piT =[ Ri +( 1− Ri)e−qiS]G(qiT),
piS =[ 1− Ri + Rie−qiT]G(qiS).
(2.4)
Notice that the function G is continuous and decreasing. Thus, when there are slightly more
workers applying to a ﬁrm, each applicant is chosen by the ﬁrm with a slightly lower probability.
Now, consider a ﬁrm i’s choices of (wiT,w iS,R i). The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁti s :
πi =( 1 − e−qiT)[Ri +( 1− Ri)e−qiS][(1+δ)y − wiT]
+(1− e−qiS)[1− Ri + Rie−qiT](y − wiS).
(2.5)
The ﬁrm’s optimal choices solve the following problem:
max πi subject to (2.2) for j = T,S.
The constraint (2.2) reﬂects the fact that the ﬁrm takes into account the eﬀect of its choices on
workers’ decisions. Finally, the ﬁrm’s ranking rule must be compatible with the ﬁrm’s ex post





1, if wiT − wiS < δy
0, if wiT − wiS > δy
Φ, if wiT − wiS = δy.
(2.6)
A (symmetric) equilibrium is deﬁned as ﬁrms’ strategies (wiT,w iS,R i)M
i=1, workers’ strategies
(qiT,q iS)M
i=1, and the numbers (ET,E S) such that the following requirements are met: (i) Given
the ﬁrms’ strategies and the numbers (ET,E S), each worker’s strategy is given by (2.2); (ii) Given
the numbers (ET,E S) and anticipating workers’ responses, each ﬁrm’s strategy is optimal and
the ranking is compatible with the ﬁrm’s incentive; and (iii) the numbers (ET,E S) obey (2.1).
2.2. A Candidate Equilibrium
Let me construct a candidate equilibrium. In this equilibrium, every ﬁrm ranks type T workers
ﬁrst and every ﬁrm attracts both types of workers. That is, Ri =1 ,qiT > 0a n dqiS > 0 for all i.
Restricting the strategy to this particular type, a ﬁrm’s maximization problem simpliﬁes to:
(P) max(wiT,wiS) πi =
¡
1 − e−qiT¢
[(1 + δ)y − wiT]+e−qiT ¡
1 − e−qiS¢
(y − wiS), (2.7)
7subject to G(qiT)wiT ≥ EiT and e−qiTG(qiS)wiS ≥ EiS. These constraints are necessary for
qiT > 0a n dqiS > 0 (see (2.2)) which are stipulated for the candidate equilibrium. Notice that
both constraints must hold with equality. If one holds with strict inequality “ > ”, then qi →∞
and G(qi) → 0 which violate the corresponding constraint.




(1 + δ)y + e−qiT ¡
1 − e−qiS¢
y − (qiTEiT + qiSEiS). (2.8)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for (qiT,q iS) yield:
ye−(qiT+qiS) = ES, (2.9)
δye−qiT + ES = ET. (2.10)
Since the solution to these equations does not depend on the ﬁrm index i,a l lﬁrms use the same
strategy in the candidate equilibrium. In this case, αiT = αiS =1 /M, which implies the following
queue lengths:
qT = γθ, qS =( 1− γ)θ. (2.11)
Finally, the ﬁrst-order conditions and the constraints in problem (P) become:
ES = ye−θ, (2.12)















Proposition 2.1. The market has a unique (symmetric) equilibrium, which is characterized by
the following properties: (E1) All ﬁrms have the same strategy and rank type T workers above
type S workers (i.e., R =1 ); (E2) Each ﬁrm posts wT for type T workers and wS for type S
workers, as given by (2.14); (E3) Each worker applies to every ﬁrm with the same probability,
which yields the queue lengths (qT,q S) in (2.11) for every ﬁrm; and (E4) workers’ expected wages
satisfy (2.12) and (2.13).
8Let me discuss (2.8), (2.12) and (2.13), which will be useful later. Because all ﬁrms use the
same strategy, I will suppress the ﬁrm’s index i in this discussion. First, the condition (2.8) says
that a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁti se q u a lt ot h ed i ﬀerence between expected output and expected
wage cost. Notice that, although a ﬁrm hires only one worker, the expected wage cost on type j
workers is qjEj,a si ft h eﬁrm hires a number qj of such workers at a wage rate Ej.
Second, the conditions (2.9) and (2.10) state that a worker’s expected contribution to output,
after subtracting the amount of other workers’ expected output crowded out by this worker, is
equal to the worker’s expected market wage. Since adding a type S worker contributes to a ﬁrm’s
output only when the ﬁrm did not receive any other applicant, which occurs with probability
e−(qT+qS),at y p eS worker’s contribution to expected output is ye−(qT+qS). Similarly, a type T
worker contributes to a ﬁrm’s output by an amount (1+δ)y if the ﬁrm did not receive any other
applicant, by δy if the ﬁrm received some type S applicants but no type T applicant, and by
nothing if the ﬁrm received other type T applicants. Since the ﬁrst case occurs with probability
e−(qT+qS) and the second case occurs with probability e−qT(1 − e−qS), then the expected contri-
bution of a type T worker to output is e−qT(δy+ye−qS). Under (2.9), this equals (ES + δye−qT),
as (2.10) states.
The equilibrium in Proposition 2.1 features complete mixing of the two types of workers, in the
sense that every ﬁrm attracts both types of applicants. However, after workers’ mixed strategy is
played out, a ﬁrm may or may not received both types of applicants. If the ﬁrm does receive both
types of workers, it chooses a high-productivity worker. If the ﬁrm receives only low-productivity
workers, it selects one of them. Notice that the wages in (2.14) satisfy wT − wS < δy.T h a ti s ,
the ranking R = 1 is compatible with ﬁrms’ ex post incentive.
To verify that the strategies described in Proposition 2.1 indeed constitute an equilibrium, it
suﬃces to show that the following deviations by a single ﬁrm are not proﬁtable:
D1 A deviation that intends to attract only type T workers.
D2 A deviation that intends to attract only type S workers.
9D3 A deviation that attracts both types of workers but ranks type S workers ﬁrst.
D4 A deviation that has no selection priority.
In the next section, I will accomplish this task, and more, by proving that the described equilib-
rium is the unique (symmetric) equilibrium.
3. The Candidate Is the Unique Equilibrium
Proposition 2.1 states that there is no equilibrium other than the one described in the proposition.
To establish this result, I need to show that no other possible conﬁguration of strategies forms
an equilibrium. Let me partition the ﬁrms into two arbitrary groups, group A and group B.I n
addition to the equilibrium in Proposition 2.1, other possibilities are as follows.
N1. Complete separation of the ﬁrms into two groups, each attracting only one type of workers.
N2. Partial separation of type T workers: Group A ﬁrms attract only type T workers, while
group B ﬁrms attract both types of workers and have one of the following ranking schemes:
(N2a) ranking type T workers ﬁrst; (N2b) ranking type S workers ﬁrst.
N3. Partial separation of type S workers: Group A ﬁrms attract only type S workers, while
group B ﬁrms attract both types of workers and have one of the following ranking schemes:
(N3a) ranking type T workers ﬁrst; (N3b) ranking type S workers ﬁrst.
N4. No priority in a subset or all of the ﬁrms: A group of ﬁrms, say group A, give no priority,
while group B ﬁrms use one of the following strategies: (N4a) attracting both types and
giving no priority; (N4b) attracting both types and ranking type T workers ﬁrst; (N4c) at-
tracting both types and ranking type S workers ﬁrst; (N4d) attracting only type T workers;
(N4e) attracting only type S workers.
N5. No separation (i.e., all ﬁrms attract both types of workers) and all ﬁrms have strict ranking,
but the ranking is diﬀerent from the equilibrium one in one of the following ways: (N5a)
10group A ﬁrms give priority to type S workers and group B to type T workers; (N5b) all
ﬁrms rank type S workers ﬁrst.
For each of these possibilities, I will use the same procedure to show that it is not an equi-
librium. First, supposing that one of the above possibilities is an equilibrium, I will compute the
wages posted by each ﬁrm, the expected number of applicants of each type whom a ﬁrm attracts,
and expected wages in the market. Second, I will construct a single ﬁrm’s deviation from this
supposed equilibrium and toward the one described in Proposition 2.1. I will show that this
deviation is proﬁtable, and so the possibility is not an equilibrium.
By accomplishing this task, I also succeed in showing that the deviations D1 through D4
described earlier are not proﬁtable against the equilibrium strategies. To see this, notice that I
can let the size of group A ﬁrms approach zero. Then some of the above possibilities become a
single ﬁrm’s deviations from the equilibrium described in Proposition 2.1. In particular, case N2a
becomes the deviation D1, case N3a becomes the deviation D2, case N5a becomes the deviation
D3, and case N4b becomes the deviation D4. Because in these cases a ﬁrm can proﬁtf r o mm a k i n g
the strategies closer to the equilibrium strategies, the deviations D1 through D4 can be improved
upon by further deviations toward the equilibrium strategies. Therefore, the strategies described
in Proposition 2.1 form an equilibrium.
3.1. Separation Is Not an Equilibrium
Consider ﬁrst the case of complete separation, i.e., Case N1. In this case, group A ﬁrms attract
only type T workers and group B ﬁrms attract only type B workers. This possibility is an
equilibrium in a similar model by Lang et al. (2002) who assume that each ﬁrm can post only
one wage. When each ﬁrm can condition the wage on the type of the hired worker, complete
separation is no longer an equilibrium.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose that complete separation is an equilibrium, as in Case
N1. A ﬁrm in group A can maintain the same wage for type T workers and rank such workers
ﬁrst as in the supposed equilibrium, but chooses a wage to attract type S workers as well. Type
11T workers will not change their strategy of applying to this ﬁrm, and so the expected proﬁtf r o m
hiring a type T worker does not change. In the case where no type T worker shows up at the ﬁrm,
the deviating ﬁrm can hire a type S worker and obtain additional proﬁt. Thus, the deviation is
proﬁtable, provided that it is feasible and that it attracts type S workers.
To verify this intuition, let wA be the wage posted by a group A ﬁrm (for type T workers)
and wB be the wage posted by a group B ﬁrm (for type S workers). Let a be the fraction of
ﬁrms that are in group A. Then, the expected number of applicants is qA = γθ/a for a group A
ﬁrm and qB =( 1− γ)θ/(1 − a)f o rag r o u pB ﬁrm. Let b ET and b ES be expected wages of these
two types of workers, respectively, in the supposed equilibrium of separation. Then,
G(qA)wA = b ET, G(qB)wB = b ES.
Because the two types of workers are completely separated, there is no crowding-out between
them. Thus, the expected wage of each type of workers is equal to the worker’s expected marginal
contribution to output. That is,5
b ET =( 1+δ)ye−qA, b ES = ye−qB. (3.1)




[(1 + δ)y − wA]=( 1+δ)y
£







1 − (1 + qB)e−qB¤
.
For a to be in (0,1), a ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between being in the two groups. Thus, πA = πB.
This requirement yields qA <q B, i.e., a>γ, for all δ > 0. If δ =0 ,t h e na = γ.
Now consider the following deviation by a single ﬁrm in group A.T h eﬁrm maintains the wage
wA for type T workers and still ranks these workers ﬁrst. In contrast to the supposed equilibrium,
5To verify this, consider a type A ﬁrm’s deviation to a wage w
d
A for type T workers and suppose that this
deviating ﬁrm still attracts only type T workers (e.g., the ﬁrm sets zero wage for type S workers). Then, the ﬁrst-
order condition for this deviation yields (1 + δ)ye
−qd
A = b ET,w h e r eq
d
A is the expected number of type T workers
that the deviating ﬁrm will attract. For this deviation to be not proﬁtable against the supposed equilibrium, we
must have q
d
A = qA = γθ/a.T h u s ,b ET =( 1+δ)ye
−qA. The expression for b ES can be obtained similarly by
considering a group B ﬁrm’s deviation.
12the deviating ﬁrm posts wd
AS for type S workers and ranks them below type T workers. It is
clear that a type T worker will apply to the deviating ﬁr mw i t ht h es a m ep r o b a b i l i t ya si nt h e
supposed equilibrium, and so the expected number of type T workers whom the ﬁrm will receive
is qA = γθ/a.L e t qd
AS be the expected number of type S workers whom the deviating ﬁrm
will receive. Then, the probability with which an individual type S worker who applies to the
deviating ﬁrm will be selected is e−qAG(qd
AS). Let wd
AS and the associated queue length qd
AS
satisfy the following conditions:
e−qAG(qd
AS)wd
AS = b ES,y e −[qA+qd
AS] = b ES. (3.2)
The ﬁrst condition requires the deviation to give a type S applicant the same expected wage as
in the market, and the second condition requires the deviation to be the best of its kind so that
at y p eS worker’s expected output is equal to the expected wage in the market.
The deviation has the following features. First, the deviation indeed attracts type S workers.
To see this, substituting b ES from (3.1) into the second equation in (3.2) yields qd
AS = qB − qA,
which is positive as shown earlier. Second, the deviation is feasible in the sense that wd
AS <y .








Notice that the strict inequality implies that the deviating ﬁrm obtains a positive proﬁtf r o m
hiring a type S worker when no type T worker shows up at the ﬁrm. Finally, the deviator’s
ranking of the two types of workers is compatible with the ﬁrm’s incentive; i.e., the deviation
satisﬁes wA − wd
AS < δy. To verify this, temporarily denote ∆ = qB − qA (> 0). Substituting
(wd
AS,w A) from the above, I can rewrite the compatibility condition as
1 − (1 + ∆ + qA)e−(∆+qA)
1 − e−qA >
1 − (1 + ∆)e−∆
1 − e−∆ .




1−e−∆,t h e n
1 − (1 + ∆ + qA)e−(∆+qA)





1 − e−∆ =
1 − (1 + ∆)e−∆
1 − e−∆ .
13That is, the required condition holds.
Because the deviating ﬁrm’s expected proﬁtf r o mt y p eT workers is the same as in the sup-
posed equilibrium and the additional expected proﬁtf r o mt y p eS workers is strictly positive, the
deviation is proﬁtable. Thus, complete separation is not an equilibrium.
Similarly, partial separation as in Case N2 and Case N3 cannot be an equilibrium. A ﬁrm
that attracts only one type of workers can increase its expected proﬁt by deviating to a strategy
that attracts both types of workers.
3.2. The Two Types of Workers Are Strictly Ranked by Firms
In all the cases examined so far, ﬁrms rank the two types of workers strictly. Now, I examine the
cases in which some or all ﬁrms use no priority, i.e., the sub-cases of case N4. By showing that
these cases are not an equilibrium, I establ i s ht h er e s u l tt h a ti ti so p t i m a lf o ra l lﬁrms to rank
the two types of workers.
Suppose, to the contrary, that one of the cases N4a through N4e is an equilibrium. Because
complete separation is not an equilibrium, one group of ﬁrms or both groups must attract both
types of workers. Without loss of generality, assume that group A ﬁrms attract both types of
workers. Let a be the fraction of ﬁrms in group A.F o re a c hﬁrm in group A,l e tπA be the ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁt, wAj the wage for type j workers, and qAj the expected number of type j workers
for the ﬁrm, where j = T,S.L e tb Ej be the expected market wage of a type j worker. Because
at y p eA ﬁrm does not rank the workers, the queue length of workers for the ﬁrm is qAT + qAS,
which is temporarily denoted k. For both types of workers to apply to the ﬁrm, the following
conditions must hold:
G(k)wAj = b Ej,j = T,S.
Ag r o u pA ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between the two types of workers after both show up at the








b ET − b ES
δy
.
14Moreover, ( b ET, b ES,w AT,w AS) are all positive and the relationship b ES ≥ ye−k holds.6
Ag r o u pA ﬁrm can proﬁt by deviating to a strategy that ranks type T workers ﬁrst. Let
(wd
AT,wd
AS)b et h ew a g e sf o rt h et w ot y p e so fw o r k e r sp o s t e db yt h ed e v i a t i n gﬁrm and (qd
AT,qd
AS)
be the corresponding queue lengths. Let the deviation satisfy:
G(qd
AT)wd
AT = b ET,e −qd
ATG(qd
AS)wd
AS = b ES,
ye−[qd
AT+qd
AS] = b ES, δye−qd
AT = b ET − b ES.
Denote kd = qd
AT + qd
AS.B e c a u s eb ES ≥ ye−k,t h e nkd ≤ k. Because δyG(k)= b ET − b ES,t h e n
e−qd
AT = G(k). Since e−z <G (z)f o ra l lz>0, then G(k) <G (qd
AT), which implies k>q d
AT.
















=( 1+δ)y − (1 + qd
AT) b ET − qd
AS
b ES.
The second equality is obtained from substituting e−qd
AT =(b ET − b ES)/(δy)a n de−kd
= b ES/y.
The expected proﬁt from not deviating is πA =( 1− e−k)(1 + δ)y − k b ET. The gain from the
deviation is
πd








AT) − (1 + kd − k)e(k−kd)
i
.
The function (1 − z)ez is decreasing for all z>0. Since k>q d
AT and k ≥ kd,t h e nπd
A − πA > 0.
That is, the deviation is proﬁtable.
3.3. High-Productivity Workers Have the Priority
Since Cases N1 through N4 are not an equilibrium, all ﬁrms in an equilibrium must attract both
types of workers and have a strict ranking of the two types. Now I show that the ranking must
6To show b ES > 0, suppose to the contrary that b ES =0 . T h e nwAS =0a n dπA =( 1− e
−k)y.I nt h i sc a s e ,a
single ﬁrm in group A can deviate to w
d
AS = ε and w
d
AT = wAT + ε,w h e r eε > 0i sas u ﬃciently small number. It
can be shown that this deviation is proﬁtable. Because k>0, then b ES > 0i m p l i e st h a t(b ET,w AT,w AS)a r ea l l
positive. To show b ES ≥ ye
−k,s u p p o s eb ES <y e
−k, instead. An individual ﬁrm in group A ﬁrm can deviate to
w
d
AT =0a n dw
d
AS > 0. This deviation attracts only type S workers. Let w
d







AS = b ES = ye
−qd
AS. Then, this deviation can be shown to be proﬁtable.
15be R = 1; that is, it is optimal for ﬁrms to rank the workers according to productivity. This is
done by excluding the possibilities N5a and N5b as equilibrium.
Consider Case N5a ﬁrst, where group A ﬁrms rank type S workers ﬁrst and group B ﬁrms
rank type T workers ﬁrst. In this case, a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt is higher in group B than in group
A, and so the case is not an equilibrium. To see this, let (wiT,w iS) be the wages posted by a ﬁrm
in group i,w h e r ei = A,B,a n d( qiT,q iS) be the corresponding queue lengths. Denote the total
expected number of workers attracted by a group i ﬁrm as ki = qiT +qiS,a n dt h eﬁrm’s expected
proﬁta sπi.D e n o t e a t y p e j worker’s expected market wages as b Ej. Then, the maximization
problem of a ﬁrm in each group yields:
(1 + δ)ye−kA = b ET, δye−qAS = b ET − b ES,
ye−kB = b ES, δye−qBT = b ET − b ES.
These equations imply qBT = qAS.A l s o ,ag r o u pB ﬁrm attracts more workers than a group A
ﬁrm. More precisely, with the temporary notation ∆ = kB −qBT (> 0), I can derive the following
result from the above equations:











1 − (1 + qBT)e−qBT¤
+ e−kB
h
(kA − qBT)δe(kB−qBT) − (kB − kA)
i
.
The ﬁrst term of this diﬀerence is positive. So is the second term.7 Thus, πB > πA.
Finally, suppose that case N5b is an equilibrium, where each ﬁrm attracts both types of
workers and ranks type S workers ﬁrst. Let the wages posted by each ﬁrm be (wT,w S)a n dt h e
7To verify this, substitute kA to obtain:
(kA − qBT)δe










This expression is an increasing function of ∆ for all ∆ > 0a n d ,a t∆ = 0, it is equal to 0. Thus, the expression is
positive for all ∆ > 0.
16corresponding queue lengths be (qT,q S). Denote k = qT +qS and denote a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt
as π. Then,
(1 + δ)ye−k = b ET, δye−qS = b ET − b ES,
π = y + δy[1 + qS]e−qS − (1 + k)e−k.
Moreover, since all ﬁrms attract the same expected number and composition of workers, qT = γθ
and qS =( 1− γ)θ. Consider a deviation by an individual ﬁrm to wages (wd
AT,wd
AS)t h a ta r e
intended to attract both types of workers and that give type T workers priority. Let (qd
AT,qd
AS)
be the corresponding queue lengths and let the deviation be the best of its kind (i.e., let it satisfy
the corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions). Let (qd
AT,qd
AS) serve the roles of (qAT,q AS)i nt h ea b o v e
proof for case N5a, and let (qT,q S) serve the roles of (qBT,q BS). Then, the same proof shows
that the deviation increases the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt. In addition, it can be shown that the
condition, (1 + δ)y − wd
AT >y− wd
AS, holds so that the ranking in the deviation is compatible
with the ﬁrm’s ex post incentive.8 Therefore, it is proﬁtable to deviate from the strategies in N5b
to one that ranks type T workers above type S workers.
4. Properties of the Equilibrium and the Social Optimum
In this section I examine the properties of the equilibrium and show that the equilibrium is
socially eﬃcient. The following proposition can be readily conﬁrmed from (2.11) through (2.14).
Proposition 4.1. The equilibrium described in Proposition 2.1 has the following properties.
(i) A ﬁrm’s ex post proﬁtf r o mat y p eT worker is higher than from a type S worker.
8To verify this condition, use the ﬁrst-order conditions to solve the queue lengths induced by the deviation as
q
d






.T h ew a g e sa r ew
d













Then the required condition holds if and only if the following condition holds:








(1 + δ)(eγθ − 1)
.
Using the solution for q
d
AS obtained earlier, I can show that the right-hand side of the above inequality is increasing






. The last expression
is a concave function of γ,a n di ti se q u a lt o0a tb o t hγ =0a n dγ = 1. Thus, it is positive for all γ ∈ (0,1).
17(ii) A type T worker has a higher employment probability than a type S worker.
(iii) ET >E S,a n d(ET − ES) is of the same order of magnitude as δ.
(iv) ∃δ1 > δ0 > 0 such that wT <w S for all δ ∈ [0,δ0) and wT >w S for all δ > δ1.
(v) Deﬁne ∆ = wS
wT −1. ∃δ2 > 0 such that, if 0 < δ <m i n {δ0,δ2},t h e nd∆
dδ < 0, d∆
dθ > 0, d∆
dγ > 0.
The properties (i), (ii) and (iii) are intuitive. Property (i) repeats an earlier result that it
is optimal for all ﬁrms to rank the workers according to productivity. Such ranking gives each
high-productivity worker a higher employment probability and higher expected wage than a low-
productivity worker. Moreover, high-productivity workers get a higher expected wage, and the
diﬀerential in the expected wage is of the same order of magnitude as the productivity diﬀerential.
However, the actual wage is not always higher for high-productivity workers. As stated in
property (iv), only when the productivity diﬀerential is suﬃciently large do high-productivity
workers get a higher actual wage than low-productivity workers. When the productivity diﬀer-
ential is small, workers with higher productivity get lower wages. This reverse wage diﬀerential
arises from the ranking of workers. An increase in the ranking increases a worker’s employment
probability, and hence the expected wage, by a discrete amount. So, when a ﬁrm awards slightly
more productive workers with a higher ranking, it can cut the wage for these workers by a discrete
amount and yet still be able to attract them. By doing so, the ﬁrm can increase expected proﬁt.
Moreover, the size of the reverse wage diﬀerential increases as the productivity diﬀerential
(δ) decreases. Although unconventional, this result is quite intuitive. When the productivity
advantage of one set of workers shrinks relative to other workers, maintaining the employment
priority for these workers is optimal for a ﬁrm only if their wage is reduced. An implication of this
result is that the reverse wage diﬀerential remains strictly positive as the productivity diﬀerential
approaches zero. However, if the economy literally has δ = 0, there is another equilibrium in
which all workers are paid the same wage. This equilibrium with a uniform age is not selected as
the limit outcome of a sequence of economies in which the productivity diﬀerential is positive.
18The above results suggest that actual wages can sometimes be a bad indicator of workers’
productivity. Thus, the standard practice in labor economics that attributes wage diﬀerentials to
productivity diﬀerentials should be taken with caution. First, a large residual wage diﬀerential
might be attributed to a statistically insigniﬁcant diﬀerential in productivity, as it is the case
here when δ is small. In this case, it is futile trying to explain the wage diﬀerential by ever
expanding the list of workers’ characteristics. Second, there is nothing abnormal about a residual
wage diﬀerential; rather, it is part of the equilibrium with fully rational players in a frictional
labor market. Also, the residual wage diﬀerential is socially eﬃcient, as shown below. Third,
when similar workers get diﬀerent wages, the ones who receive lower wage are not necessarily
discriminated against. For example, where the productivity diﬀerential is small, the reverse
wage diﬀerential is just a compensation to low-productivity workers for being ranked low in the
selection. Despite the lower wage in this case, high-productivity workers are not discriminated
against, because they are ranked the ﬁrst for the job and they obtain higher expected wage.
The wage diﬀerential in this model also responds to the market condition in an interesting
way. When there is a reverse wage diﬀerential as a result of a small productivity diﬀerential,
an increase in the overall ratio of workers to ﬁrms, θ, increases the reverse wage diﬀerential.
The explanation is as follows. When jobs become more scarce, workers value the employment
probability more than the wage. Since high-productivity workers are given a higher employment
probability through the ranking scheme, they are willing to take a larger wage cut to maintain
this diﬀerence in the employment probability.
I now turn to the eﬃciency of the equilibrium. Since the equilibrium has unconventional
features in wages, it is interesting to see whether the equilibrium is eﬃcient under the constraint
of the matching frictions. To examine eﬃciency, let me take aggregate output as the measure of
social welfare. This measure is appropriate here because all agents are risk neutral.
Suppose that a ﬁctional social planner tries to maximize aggregate output, subject to the
same restrictions that matching frictions generate in the equilibrium. One of these restrictions is
19that the ﬁrms cannot separate two identical workers. This restriction requires that the planner
must treat all workers in the same group in the same way in the matching process. Thus, the
planner can divide the ﬁrms into at most two groups, with each group potentially targeting a
diﬀerent group of workers. Another restriction is that the matching function in each group of
workers and ﬁrms must be the same as in the equilibrium. To describe the matching function,
let the two groups of ﬁrms be indexed by i,w h e r ei = A, B. Let group i ﬁrms be a fraction ai
of all ﬁrms, where aA + aB =1 .L e tqij be the expected number of type j workers for each ﬁrm
in group i,w h e r ej = T,S.L e t Ri be the ranking of the workers by a ﬁrm in group i,w h e r e
Ri ∈ {1,0,Φ}. As in the market equilibrium, the matching function facing the social planner is
such that, in each group i,aﬁrm receives one or more type j worker with probability (1−e−qij).
A planner’s allocation is (ai,q iT,q iS,R i)i=A,B.
Expected output of a ﬁrm in group i is
Ri [(1 − e−qiT)(1+δ)y + e−qiT (1 − e−qiS)y]
+(1 − Ri)[(1− e−qiS)y + e−qiS (1 − e−qiT)(1+δ)y].
Re-arranging terms and weighting each group’s output by the group’s size, I can express expected












Ri +( 1− Ri)e−qiS¤o
.
The planner chooses (ai,q iT,q iS,R i)i=A,B to maximize this output, subject to qiT ≥ 0, qiS ≥ 0
and the following (resource) constraints:
aA + aB =1 ,a A,a B ∈ [0,1],
aAqAj + aBqBj ≤ γjθ, for j = T,S. (4.1)
Here γT = γ and γS =1− γ.T h eﬁrst constraint is self-explanatory. The second constraint is
the adding-up constraint (2.3) in the current context.
The following proposition holds and a proof is supplied in Appendix A:
20Proposition 4.2. The eﬃcient allocation coincides with the equilibrium allocation described in
Proposition 2.1.
The reason why the equilibrium is eﬃcient is similar to that in other directed search models,
e.g., Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Shi (2001, 2002). In particular, the directed
search framework allows the ﬁrms to internalize the matching externalities. One way to see this
is to recall the expressions for workers’ expected market wages, ET and ES,w h i c ha r eg i v e nb y
(2.12) and (2.13). For each type of workers, the expected market wage is equal to the worker’s
marginal contribution to expected output which takes into account the worker’s crowding-out
on other workers’ expected output. As a result, a worker’s expected wage in the equilibrium
is equal to the worker’s social marginal value. To express this equality more formally, notice
that a type j worker’s social marginal value is equal to the Lagrangian multiplier of (4.1) in the
planner’s problem, denoted λj. Then, it can be veriﬁed that λj = Ej,f o rb o t hj = T and S.
Because expected wages take into account each worker’s crowding-out on other workers, they
share the property of the eﬃcient mechanisms described by Mortensen (1982, pp968-969) and
Hosios (1990).
Let me make a few remarks on the eﬃciency result. First, it is expected wages, not actual
wages, that serve the role of the eﬃcient compensation scheme. To achieve eﬃciency, the market
mechanism requires the use of not only prices (wages) but also the ranking of the workers. Second,
separating the two types of workers in the matching process, completely or partially, is ineﬃcient.
Third, because the equilibrium is the only equilibrium, the wage diﬀerential (sometimes a reverse
one) and the ranking are eﬃcient.9
Now it is useful to contrast the results in my model with those in Lang et al. (2002). As
mentioned before, the main diﬀerence is that Lang et al. restricts each ﬁrm to post only one wage.
This restriction generates several important diﬀerences in results. First, complete separation is an
equilibrium in Lang et al. but not in my model. Second, the workers who have a lower employment
9Although I have not examined entry by ﬁrms, it can be done easily (see the end of Section 5.1).
21probability in my model can get higher wage than other workers when the productivity diﬀerential
is small. This does not occur in Lang et al.. Third, the equilibrium in my model is ineﬃcient, but
not in Lang et al.. In particular, the separation of the two types of workers, the wage diﬀerential
and the employment diﬀerence between workers in the model of Lang et al. are all ineﬃcient.
5. Extension to Many Types of Workers
In this section I extend the model to incorporate many types of workers. One purpose of this
analysis is to check whether the results in the simple model are robust. The other purpose is to
examine how wages vary when the workers’ productivity varies in a wide range.
5.1. The Equilibrium and Its Properties
Let there be J ≥ 2 types of workers, which are indexed by j =1 ,2,...,J. The productivity of a
type j worker is yj and each worker is of type j with probability γj,w h e r ey1 >y 2 >. . .>y J
and
PJ
j=1 γj = 1. As before, I examine only the symmetric equilibrium, where all workers of the
same type use the same strategy. In the presence of a large number of types of workers, it is
diﬃcult to establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Thus, I will only establish the existence
of an equilibrium resembling the one in the simple model, i.e., an equilibrium in which all ﬁrms
attract all types of workers and rank the workers according to productivity.
To examine this equilibrium, I need to examine deviations that do not attract all types of
workers or do not rank the workers according to productivity. To do so, I introduce the following
general notation. Use the notation i Â i0 to mean that a ﬁrm ranks type i workers above type
i0 workers in the hiring process. For any integer K with 1 ≤ K ≤ J,Iu s eK to stand for both
the number K and the ordered set {1,2,...,K}, where the ordering is 1 Â 2 Â ... Â K.A si nt h e
simple model, it is not optimal for a ﬁrm to give the same ranking to two types of workers. Thus,
I will restrict attention to strategies, including deviations, that have strict ranking over the types
of workers. A strategy is deﬁned by three characteristics: a strictly ordered set of types, C,a
vector of wages, w, and the associated vector of queue lengths, q.10 The set C contains the types
10Strictly speaking, q should be treated as the workers’ strategy, rather than a ﬁrm’s. However, the use of q as
22of workers that a ﬁrm attracts and the ordering of these types. It is useful to express C as
C =( jk)
K
k=1 ,j k ∈ J, K ≤ J,
so that the ranking in C is according to the index k,w i t hj1 being ranked the ﬁrst. The vectors





Then, Qjk is the expected number of workers whom the ﬁrm attracts and whose ranking is higher
than or equal to k in C.S e tQj0 =0 .
An equilibrium consists of a strategy, (C,w,q), where the ordering in C is strict, and a vector
of expected market wages, E, such that (i) given E, the strategy is optimal for each ﬁrm, and
(ii) the strategy induces E.
The particular equilibrium which resembles the unique equilibrium in the simple model has
the following additional features: (i) All ﬁrms use the same strategy; (ii) Every ﬁrm attracts all
types of workers; and (iii) C = J, i.e., every ﬁrm ranks the workers according to productivity.
With these features, each worker applies to all ﬁrms with the same probability, and so qj = γjθ
for all j ∈ J.
To characterize this equilibrium, suppose that each ﬁrm attracts all types of workers and
ranks the workers according to the ordered set J. Then, with probability e−Qj−1,aﬁrm receives
no applicant whose productivity is higher than yj. Thus, the probability with which the ﬁrm
successfully hires a type j worker is e−Qj−1 (1 − e−qj)=e−Qj−1 −e−Qj. Similarly, a type j worker














a ﬁrm’s choice is convenient and it does not change the analysis. As it is clear from the simple model, a ﬁrm that
intends to attract a type of workers must oﬀer a combination of a wage and a queue length that gives the worker
the expected market wage. Under this constraint, the ﬁrm’s choice of w eﬀectively determines q.
23s.t. pjwj ≥ Ej for all j.( 5 . 3 )
Because the ﬁrm attracts all types of workers in the conjectured equilibrium, then qj > 0f o r
all j and (5.3) holds with equality. Thus,
wj = Ej/pj for all j.( 5 . 4 )
In fact, as mentioned earlier, q is given as
qj = γjθ for all j.( 5 . 5 )
Because qj > 0, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the above problem yield:







,a l l j. (5.6)
Notice that, since G(q) >e −q for all q>0, then pj >e −Qj from (5.2) and pjwj = Ej <p jyj
from (5.6). That is, the wage rate speciﬁed by (5.4) is feasible for all j.
This compensation scheme generalizes (2.12) and (2.13). The right-hand side is a type j
worker’s expected contribution to output. The ﬁrst term is a type j worker’s contribution to
output when the ﬁrm does not receive any applicant whose productivity is higher than or equal
to yj. The second term is expected output that a type j worker crowds out on the workers of lower
productivity. Thus, the compensation scheme requires a worker’s expected wage to be equal to
the worker’s expected output minus the worker’s expected crowding-out on other workers’ output.
For this reason, the compensation scheme is socially eﬃcient.
Proposition 5.1. The strategy (J,w,q) and the vector E form an equilibrium if the ranking in
J is strict and if (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6) are satisﬁed. In this equilibrium, pj >p j+1, Ej >E j+1,
wj <y j and wj − yj <w j+1 − yj+1 for all j. However, wj <w j+1 if (yj − yj+1) is small.
A proof of this proposition appears in Appendix B. The intuition for why the particular
(J,w,q)a n dE form an equilibrium is as follows. Consider a deviation by a single ﬁrm to
(C,qd,wd), where C =( jk)K
k=1 for 1 ≤ K ≤ J. First, any deviation that does not rank the
24workers according to productivity can be improved upon. If there are two types of workers in C,
say types js and js+1, whose relative ranking is opposite to productivity, then I can construct a
further deviation that switches the rankings of these two types while maintaining the same wages
and queue lengths for other types in C. Relative to the original deviation, the further deviation
attracts more type js+1 workers and fewer type js workers. Since type js+1 workers are more
productive than type js workers, the gain from the further deviation outweighs the loss, and so
this further deviation improves upon the original deviation.
Second, any deviation that does not attract all types of workers can be improved upon. If the
deviation does not attract type j∗ workers, where js <j ∗ <j s+1, then I can construct a further
deviation that attracts type j∗ workers and ranks type j∗ between js and js+1. This further
deviation gives the same wages and queue lengths to all the workers in the set C, except type
js+1. In addition, the sum of the queue lengths of type j∗ and type js+1 workers in the further
deviation is equal to the queue length of type js+1 workers in the original deviation. Again, the
gain from the higher productivity workers (type j∗) outweighs the loss from the lower productivity
workers (type js+1), and so this further deviation improves upon the original deviation.
Notice that the further deviations in the above construction move the strategies toward the
equilibrium strategy described in Proposition 5.1. They share with the equilibrium strategy
the feature that every ﬁrm attracts all types of workers and ranks the workers according to
productivity. By construction, however, all strategies with this feature are dominated by the
strategy in the described equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium described in Proposition 5.1 is
indeed an equilibrium.
Because the equilibrium in this extended economy is of the same type as the one in the simple
model, it is not surprising that it has similar properties. In particular, higher productivity workers
have a higher employment probability and higher expected wage. Also, actual wages exhibit a
diﬀerential opposite to the productivity diﬀerential when the productivity diﬀerential is small.11
11As in the simple model, expected wages in the equilibrium internalize the matching externalities. Thus, the
equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient.
25The dependence of the actual wage on productivity can exhibit a number of diﬀerent pat-
terns. One is that the actual wage decreases in productivity, which occurs when the productivity
diﬀerential (yj −yj+1)i ss m a l lf o ra l lj. The opposite pattern is that the actual wage increases in
productivity, which occurs when (yj − yj+1) is large for all j. Non-monotonic patterns can also
arise. For example, if (yj − yj+1) is large for large j and decreases sharply as j decreases, then
the actual wage increases ﬁrst when productivity increases from the lowest level but decreases
when productivity is suﬃciently high.
The equilibrium wage distribution also depends on the pattern of productivity and the distri-
bution of workers. To compute the wage distribution, recall that each type j worker is employed
with probability pj.S i n c et h es i z eo ft y p ej workers in the labor force is γj, the expected number











The total number of employed workers of all types is (1 − e−θ)/θ, which is independent of the







1 − e−θ. (5.7)
Because pj >p j+1,t h e nfj/γj >f j+1/γj+1. That is, the higher the productivity of a type of
workers, the larger the fraction of these workers will be employed. If all types of workers have the
same size in the labor force, then the density of wages is an increasing function of productivity.
However, because wages are not necessarily an increasing function of productivity, the density of
wages can be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in wages. In the next subsection, I will
provide some numerical examples to illustrate this distribution.
Before providing the numerical examples, let me introduce ﬁrms’ entry into the market. Sup-
pose that ﬁrms compete in setting up vacancies and the cost of setting up a vacancy is c.A f t e r
the vacancies are set up, the ﬁrms play the recruiting game as described before. The expected
12Obviously, there are only a ﬁnite number of wage levels in the equilibrium distribution and so the phrase
“density function” really means the frequency function.
26proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm from recruiting will depend on the overall market tightness, θ,a n ds ol e tm e
denote it as π(θ). In the equilibrium, θ is determined by π(θ)=c.
5.2. Numerical Examples
I use two examples to illustrate the wage distribution. In particular, these examples show that
the model can generate a hump-shaped density of the wage distribution as the one documented
in the literature (e.g., Mortensen, 2002). Since the model is not calibrated to the data, these
examples only illustrative. In both examples, I will set J = 20, y1 = 100, c =0 .2yJ and yj =
y1(1+j∆)1−j for all j,w h e r e∆ will be determined by the choice of yJ through the requirement
yJ = y1(1 + J∆)1−J.T h e t w o e x a m p l e s d i ﬀer from each other in ∆ and the distribution of
workers in the labor force. Of course, the equilibrium tightness and wage distribution also diﬀer
in the two examples.
Example 5.2. yJ =9 8and γj = j0.3
.PJ
j=1 j0.3. These imply ∆ =5 .319×10−5 and θ =0 .819.
In this example, the diﬀerence between the highest and the lowest productivity is small, and
the distribution of workers’ productivity in the labor force is a decreasing function. Figure 1
depicts the equilibrium in this example. In the upper panel, the variable on the horizontal axis
is an increasing function of productivity. This panel shows that the employment probability is
an increasing function of productivity, as the theory predicts. Also, because the productivity
diﬀerential is small, the wage rate is a decreasing function of productivity.
The magnitude of this reverse wage diﬀerential is worth noting: Although the lowest produc-
tivity is only 2% lower than the highest productivity, the wage of the least productive workers is
twice as much as the wage of the most productive workers. Despite this large reverse wage dif-
ferential, high-productivity workers are rewarded properly as they receive higher expected wage.
This is made possible by a positive diﬀerential in the employment probability that outweighs the
reverse wage diﬀerential.
In Figure 1, I depict the wage density and the distributional density of workers’ productivity.
The wage density is hump-shaped. Because the wage rate is a decreasing function of productivity
27in this example, the shape of the wage density implies that more workers with medium productiv-
ity are employed than workers with either very high-productivity or very low-productivity. There
are very few low-wage workers in the equilibrium because these workers are high-productivity
workers who are a small fraction of the labor force. There are also very few high-wage workers
because these workers are low-productivity workers, who have a very low ranking and hence a
very low employment probability.
The shape of the wage density sharply contrasts with the distribution of workers in the labor
force, γ. In the lower panel of Figure 1, the plot of γ is the hypothetical density of wages when
all workers of each type are employed. In contrast to the humped shape of the actual density,
this hypothetical density is increasing. For any wage level, if the actual density exceeds the
hypothetical density, the workers at that wage are employed at a rate higher than the average
employment rate; if the actual density falls below the hypothetical density, the workers at that
wage are employed at a rate lower than the average employment rate. Thus, in this example,
low-wage workers are employed at a rate higher than the average rate while high-wage workers
are employed at a rate lower than the average rate.
In the above example, the hump-shaped wage density comes with a reverse wage diﬀerential.
However, this is not an inevitable prediction of the model, as the following example shows.
Example 5.3. yJ =5 0and γj =[ j (J +1 1− j)]
4
.PJ
j=1 [j(J +1 1− j)]
4. These imply ∆ =
1.858 × 10−3 and θ =0 .696.
In contrast to Example 5.2, this example has a much larger diﬀerence between the highest
and the lowest productivity. As a result, the wage rate is an increasing function of productivity,
as depicted in the upper panel of Figure 2. Also, the distribution of workers in the labor force
has a single peak at an intermediate level of productivity, rather than being a decreasing function
of productivity. Notice that the wage diﬀerential is small, in contrast with the large diﬀerence in
productivity. The large diﬀerence in productivity induces a large diﬀerence in the employment
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Figure 1. The equilibrium and the wage density in Example 1
j: worker’s type, with a lower j corresponding to higher productivity;
wj
y1 : wage of type j workers, normalized by y1;
pj: employment probability of a type j worker;
γj:f r a c t i o no ft y p ej workers in the labor force;
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Figure 2. The equilibrium and the wage density in Example 2
j: worker’s type, with a lower j corresponding to higher productivity;
wj
y1 : wage of type j workers, normalized by y1;
pj: employment probability of a type j worker;
γj:f r a c t i o no ft y p ej workers in the labor force;
sw: wages sorted in an ascending order; f: wage density.
30The density of the wage distribution is still hump-shaped, as depicted in the lower panel of
Figure 2. The hypothetical wage density when all workers are employed, γ, is also hump-shaped.
In comparison with this hypothetical density, the equilibrium wage density peaks at a higher
wage and a larger mass is distributed at higher wages. Thus, low-wage workers are employed at
a rate lower than the average employment rate while high-wage workers are employed at a rate
higher than the average rate. This result reﬂects the fact that high-wage workers in this example
are high-productivity workers who are employed with a higher probability.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I construct a search model of a large labor market in which workers are heterogeneous
in productivity and (homogeneous) ﬁrms post wages to direct workers’ search. Each ﬁrm can
rank the applicants and post diﬀerent wages for diﬀerent types of workers. Workers cannot
coordinate their applications. In the unique (symmetric) equilibrium, high-productivity workers
have a higher priority in employment and higher expected wages than low-productivity workers.
The equilibrium is socially eﬃcient. However, high-productivity workers receive higher actual
wages than low-productivity workers only when the productivity diﬀerential is large. When the
productivity diﬀerential is small, workers of higher productivity are paid lower wages. Moreover,
this reverse wage diﬀerential increases as the productivity diﬀerential decreases and so it is strictly
positive even when the productivity diﬀerential approaches zero.
These results suggest that actual wages may not be a good indicator of productivity. They
also show that wage diﬀerentials among similar workers should not always be construed as dis-
crimination, as they have often been viewed in the literature. Rather, the diﬀerence in workers’
expected payoﬀs is a more reliable measure of discrimination. For example, when the produc-
tivity diﬀerential is so small that it appears statistically insigniﬁcant to an econometrician (but
observable to the employers), the current model implies that the workers with slightly higher
productivity obtain lower wage than other workers. Guided by the convention, the econometri-
cian would conclude that high-productivity workers are discriminated against. This would be
31misleading, because high-productivity workers enjoy a higher ranking and higher expected wage.
A natural question is whether the wage diﬀerential can persist in the long run. In a dynamic
environment, the search model will have exogenous separation between matched ﬁrms and work-
ers. A wage diﬀerential will continue to exist in the steady state, but it may not be reversely
related to productivity when the productivity diﬀerential is small. For the reverse wage diﬀeren-
tial to survive in the steady state, exogenous job separation must be high. Finding out how high
a job separation rate is needed is a quantitative exercise.
An extension to a dynamic economy will also generate some interesting predictions on the
time path of wages. For example, consider the model with only two types of workers and suppose
that the productivity diﬀerential between the two is small. Then, employed workers of high
p r o d u c t i v i t ya r em o r el i k e l yt os e a r c ho nt h ej o bt h a ne m p l o y e dw o r k e r so fl o wp r o d u c t i v i t y .
This implies that high-productivity workers will have a steeper wage path, even though there
is no learning-by-doing or human capital accumulation. Analyzing such on-the-job search is
diﬃcult in an environment with directed search. The reason is that, when oﬀe r i n gaw a g e ,aﬁrm
must take into account not only workers’ tradeoﬀ between the wage and the current employment
probability, but also the tradeoﬀ between the current wage and the probability of getting higher
wage in the future. Perhaps a quantitative analysis can be conducted.
32Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 4.2
I can assume aA > 0a n daB > 0 without loss of generality. To see this, suppose that an allocation





can be constructed as follows: a∗
A = a∗
B =1 /2, q∗
AT = q∗
BT = qAT, q∗
AS = q∗
BS = qAS,a n d
R∗
A = R∗
B = RA. This alternative allocation is equivalent to the original allocation, except that
it re-labels a half of the ﬁrms in the original group A as group B.
Let λj be the Lagrangian multiplier of (4.1) in the planner’s maximization problem. Then,
the ﬁrst-order conditions of qiT and qiS are as follows:
λT/y ≥ e−(qiT+qiS) + δe−qiT £
Ri +( 1− Ri)e−qiS¤
, “=”i fqiT > 0, (A.1)
λS/y ≥ e−(qiT+qiS) − δ
¡
1 − e−qiT¢
(1 − Ri)e−qiS, “=”i fqiS > 0. (A.2)














− (qAT − qBT)λT/y − (qAS − qBS)λS/y.
The following features can be easily deduced from the planner’s problem. First, from inspect-
ing the objective function, I can infer that the choice Ri =1i se ﬃcient whenever qiT > 0a n d
qiS > 0. Second, it is eﬃcient to utilize both types of workers, in the sense that qAj +qBj > 0f o r
both j = T,S. To see this, suppose qAS = qBS = 0, to the contrary. Then, (4.1) does not bind
and so λS = 0. Because type S workers are not assigned to match with any ﬁrm, the ranking R
is irrelevant for the allocation, and so Ri can be set to 1. In this case, (A.2) implies 0 ≥ e−qiT for
i = A,B, which is a contradiction. Similarly, the choices qAT = qBT = 0 are not eﬃcient.
With the above features, the eﬃcient allocation must be one of the following cases: (i) qiT > 0
and qiS > 0f o rb o t hi = A and B;( i i )qAT > 0a n dqAS > 0 but qBT =0<q BS; (iii) qAT > 0
and qAS > 0 but qBT > 0=qBS;( i v )qAT > 0=qAS and qBT =0<q BS.( A l l o t h e r c a s e s
33are equivalent to these four cases, with the labels A and B being switched.) In the remainder of
the proof, I will ﬁrst show that case (i) is a solution to the planner’s problem and it yields the
same allocation as the equilibrium described in Proposition 2.1. Then I will show that cases (ii)
through (iv) are not eﬃcient.
Consider case (i) ﬁrst. In this case, Ri =1f o rb o t hi = A and B.A l s o , t h e ﬁrst-order
conditions for qiT and qiS hold as equality for both i = A and B.T h e s e ﬁrst-order conditions
and constraint (4.1) together yield qAT = qBT = γθ and qAS = qBS =( 1− γ)θ.T h u s ,t h et w o
groups are identical, and the ﬁrst-order condition for a is trivially satisﬁed. This allocation is the
same as in the equilibrium described in Proposition 2.1.
In case (ii), RA = 1. Also, (A.2) holds as equality for both i = A and B, which yields
qAT + qAS = qBT + qBS. In addition, (A.1) holds with equality for i = A. Combining the




1 − (1 + qAT)e−qAT¤
.
Because 1 > (1+z)e−z for all z>0, the right-hand side of the above condition is strictly positive.
This is a contradiction, and so case (ii) is not a solution to the planner’s problem.
In case (iii), RA = 1, (A.1) holds as equality for both i = A and B, and (A.2) holds as equality
for i = A.T h u s ,
λT = ye−qAT ¡
e−qAS + δ
¢
, λS = ye−(qAT+qAS),















The right-hand side of the above condition is an increasing function of qAS and, at qAS =0 ,i t s
value is 0. Because qAS > 0, then the above condition is violated. Thus, case (iii) is not a solution
to the planner’s problem.
34Finally, consider case (iv). In this case, (A.1) holds as equality for i = A and (A.2) holds as
equality for i = B.T h u s ,λT =( 1+δ)ye−qAT and λS = ye−qBS. Substituting these results into
(A.3) yields
0=( 1+qBS)e−qBS + δ − (1 + δ)(1 + qAT)e−qAT. (A.4)
Because no type S worker applies to a group A ﬁrm, RA can be set to 1. Also, (A.2) holds as
inequality for i = A. Substituting λS = e−qBS and RA = 1, this inequality implies qBS ≤ qAT.
Since the function (1 + z)e−z is decreasing for all z>0, the result qBS ≤ qAT and the condition
(A.4) imply 0 ≥ δ [1 − (1 + qAT)e−qAT]. This cannot hold for qAT > 0. Thus, case (iv) is not a
solution to the planner’s problem. QED
B. Proof of Proposition 5.1
Before proving that the strategy described in the proposition is an equilibrium, let me verify the
properties of the equilibrium stated in the proposition. Using (5.2), I have









The inequality follows from the facts that ez − 1 >z>1 − e−z for all z>0. From (5.6), I have
Ej − Ej+1 =( yj − yj+1)e−Qj > 0.
Using this result, (5.4) implies:












Because qj <e qj − 1a n dpj >p j+1, the above condition implies wj − wj+1 <y j − yj+1 for all j.
Thus, wj − yj <w j+1 − yj+1 for all j. In turn, this implies that wj <y j for all j if and only if








The ﬁnal property of the equilibrium is that wj <w j+1 if (yj −yj+1) is small. To show this, note
from (B.1) that (pj −pj+1) is bounded strictly above zero even when (yj −yj+1) approaches zero.
Thus, (B.2) implies that wj <w j+1 when (yj − yj+1)i ss u ﬃciently small.
35Now I prove that there is no proﬁtable deviation from the strategy described in the proposition.
Consider a deviation by a single ﬁrm to the strategy (C,qd,wd), where C =( jk)K
k=1 and 1 ≤ K ≤
J. Although the ranking in C may not necessarily be strict, I will consider only the case of strict
ranking; that is, j1 Â j2 Â ... Â jK. A similar proof can be constructed to show that a deviation
to having no priority between some elements in C is not proﬁtable. With strict ranking in C,t h e

























jk is deﬁned similarly to (5.1), with qd replacing q.T h eﬁrst condition is type jk workers’
participation constraint, and the second condition comes from the ﬁrst-order condition of wd
jk.
If one of these conditions is violated, then the deviation can be improved upon by a further
deviation to the strategy that satisﬁes these conditions.
The deviation can diﬀer from the equilibrium strategy in two ways: the ranking in C may
not be according to workers’ productivity and C may not include all elements of J.I nL e m m a s
B.1 and B.2 below, I will show that if the deviation has either of these diﬀerences, then it can be
improved upon by a further deviation that eliminates the diﬀerence. Thus, a proﬁtable deviation
must attract all types of workers and rank them according to productivity. By construction, the
best strategy of this kind is the strategy proposed in the equilibrium.
Lemma B.1. A deviation that does not rank workers according to productivity can be improved
upon by another deviation that attracts the same types of workers as in the original deviation
but that ranks the workers according to productivity.
Proof. Consider the deviation (C,wd,qd) described above and suppose that the ranking in
C is not according to productivity. Then, there exists a number s =m a x {k ∈ K : yjk <y jk+1}.
That is, type js and type js+1 are the lowest ranked pair which exhibits a relative ranking
36opposite to productivity. Consider a further deviation from this deviation (C∗,q∗
nk,w∗
nk)k∈K,
where C∗ =( nk)K
k=1. This further deviation attracts the same types of workers as those contained
in C but it reverses the ranking between type js and type js+1 workers. That is, nk = jk for all
k/ ∈ {s,s +1 }, ns = js+1 and ns+1 = js.U s eq∗ to construct Q∗ similarly to (5.1). Furthermore,
let this further deviation have the following properties:
(i) For all k/ ∈ {s,s +1 }, w∗
nk = wd








(ii) For k ∈ {s,s +1 },( q∗
nk,Q ∗
nk,w∗





























For k ≤ s − 1, the two deviations have the same wages and both satisfy (B.3). Comparing
the condition (B.3) for the two deviations and working from k =1 ,Io b t a i nQ∗
nk = Qd
jk for all
k ≤ s − 1, which implies q∗
nk = qd
jk for all k ≤ s − 1. With (B.6), I have Q∗
ns+1 = Qd
js+1.U s i n g





jk for all k ≥ s+2. Th us,theonlydiﬀerence between the two deviations lies in the
employment and wages of type js and type js+1 workers.







































ns +( Ejs − Ejs+1).
From (B.4), I can derive the following relationship:
Ejs − Ejs+1 = −(yjs+1 − yjs)e
−Qd
js. (B.7)
The above two conditions imply Q∗
ns = Qd








The constraint (B.6) then yields q∗
ns+1 = q∗
js+1.
















and π∗ is given similarly. Subtract the two:

























Substituting the above results for (Q∗,q∗), the constraint (B.5) for the wages, and the relationship
(B.7), I have



















Since ez > 1+z and e−z > 1 − z for all z>0 ,t h ee x p r e s s i o ni n[ .] above is positive. Because
yjs+1 >y js,t h e nπ∗ > πd. QED
Lemma B.2. A deviation that does not attract all types of workers can be improved upon by a
further deviation that attracts all types.
Proof. Let the original deviation be (C,wd,qd), where C =( jk)K
k=1 and jk ∈ J. Because the
deviation does not attract all types, then K<J . With Lemma B.1, I can assume that C ranks
38the workers by productivity, i.e., j1 <j 2 <. . .<j K. Also, since any deviation that does not
satisfy (B.3) and (B.4) can be improved upon, the deviation must satisfy these conditions. Let
j∗ =m a x {j ∈ J\K}. There are two cases to consider: j∗ >j K and j∗ <j K.
If j∗ >j K, construct the further deviation (C∗,w∗,q∗)a sf o l l o w s .S e tC∗ = {j1,j 2,...,j K,j K+1},
where jK+1 = j∗. For every k ≤ K, set the wage w∗
jk = wd
jk and let the constraint (B.3) hold.
For k = K + 1, let (B.3) and (B.4) hold. Then, q∗
jk = qd
jk for all k ≤ K. This further deviation
increases the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt, provided w∗
jK+1 <y jK+1. The latter condition can be veriﬁed.
Now examine the case j∗ <j K.L e ts<Kbe such that js−1 <j ∗ <j s. From the original
deviation, I construct a further deviation (C∗,w∗,q∗), where C∗ =( nk)K+1





jk, if k ≤ s − 1
j∗, if k = s
jk−1, if k ≥ s +1 .





strategy in the further deviation satisfy the following properties:
(i) For all k ≤ s − 1, w∗
nk = wd























all k ≤ s − 1. For k ≥ s,r e c a l lt h a tnk+1 = jk. Subtract (B.4) for jk in the original deviation








, all k ≥ s




jk. Changing the index k to k + 1 and subtracting the resulted
equation from the above equation, I obtain (yjk −yjk+1)Djk =0 .S i n c eyjk >y jk+1,t h e nDjk =0
for all k ≥ s.T h a ti s ,
Q∗
nk+1 = Qd








jk,a l lk ≥ s.
Working from k = K − 1t ok = s, the above equation yields
q∗
nk+1 = qd









Since (B.3) holds in both deviations, the above equalities imply
w∗
nk+1 = wd
jk,a l lk ≥ s +1 .
Thus, the only diﬀerence between the two deviations lies in type ns and type ns+1 workers.
Let πd be the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt with the original deviation and π∗ with the further
deviation. Then























Substitute (B.3) for wd and its counterpart for w∗, substitute the relationship (B.7), and use the
above relationships between (Q∗,q∗)a n d( Qd,qd). Then,

















Thus, the original deviation can be improved upon by including the type ns = j∗ in the set of
workers to attract. This completes the proof of Lemma B.2 and hence of Proposition 5.1. QED
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